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IMMIGRATION BILL 2007: SPECIAL 
ADVOCATES AND THE RIGHT TO BE 
HEARD 
Lani Inverarity* 
The increasing role of "special advocates" in common law jurisdictions raises fundamental 
questions about the development of the law in response to new challenges and the extent to which 
individual rights can be abrogated in the name of national security. Special advocates are employed 
to examine and challenge classified evidence, withheld from affected persons and their legal 
advisors, in closed proceedings. They are, notionally, representing the affected person, but face an 
almost complete restriction on communication once exposed to the classified evidence. This is 
strikingly at odds with long-established norms of advocacy and a fair hearing, leading the United 
Kingdom Joint Committee on Human Rights to describe the system as "Kafkaesque".1 The special 
advocate function, widely utilised in the United Kingdom, will be statutorily introduced into New 
Zealand with the passing of the Immigration Bill 2007, mirroring a similar development in Canada. 
The Bill extends the use of classified information in immigration decision-making and allows for 
special advocates to examine and challenge classified evidence in review, appeal or detention 
proceedings. That Bill is the subject of this article. 
I INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the introduction of the special advocate function to New Zealand and its 
premise that some representation is better than none at all. As background, this article briefly 
describes the developments leading to the Bill and the introduction of the special advocate function. 
It then questions whether special advocates can guarantee proceedings that are at least "fair enough" 
in light of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights Act) protection of "the principles 
of natural justice".2  
  
*  Submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington.  I would like to 
acknowledge the assistance of Claudia Geiringer and Judge Ian Borrin. 
1  Joint Committee on Human Rights "Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 28 days, Intercept and 
Post–Charge Questioning" (16 July 2007) HL 157/HC 394, para 210. 
2  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 27(1). 
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The article concludes that, while the non-disclosure of classified information and the use of the 
special advocates does not satisfy the right to be heard, in certain circumstances and with certain 
improvements, it may nonetheless meet the requirements of natural justice or at least constitute a 
justified breach in light of national security concerns and the relative underdevelopment of due 
process protection in the immigration context. However, there is a real danger that the special 
advocate function established by the Bill, as drafted, merely gives a false impression of more 
fairness, given the significant extension of the use of classified information.  
II BACKGROUND 
A Immigration Act 1987 
The non-disclosure of classified information in immigration decision-making is a relatively 
recent development; prior to 1999 individuals being deported from New Zealand were entitled to 
know all the evidence against them.3 However, this requirement was seen to give insufficient 
protection to sensitive security information; the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS) 
claimed that relevant information was being withheld from immigration decision-making, due to 
concerns that disclosure might jeopardise intelligence-gathering operations and sources.4  
In response, Part 4A was added to the Immigration Act 1987 (1987 Act) by the Immigration 
Amendment Act 1999. Under Part 4A, the Director of Security can certify, on the basis of classified 
security information, that an individual's continued presence in New Zealand constitutes a threat to 
national security.5 Affected persons are entitled to review of the security risk certificate by the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security,6 but do not have access to any of the relevant 
classified information,7 restricting their ability to challenge the case against them. If the Minister of 
Immigration (Minister) elects to rely on the certificate, the affected person may be deported under 
section 72 of the 1987 Act.  
Part 4A has been used once, controversially, in the case of Ahmed Zaoui.  
B Ahmed Zaoui 
An Algerian national, Mr Zaoui sought refugee status in New Zealand in December 2002, which 
was granted by the Refugee Status Appeals Authority in August 2003. However, in March 2003 the 
Director of Security issued a security risk certificate in respect of Mr Zaoui. Review by the 
  
3  Immigration Act 1987, s 82(1)(c). 
4  Immigration Amendment Bill 1998, no 16-1 (explanatory note) iii. 
5  Immigration Act 1987, s 114D(1). 
6  Ibid, s 114I. 
7  Ibid, s 114H(2)(b). 
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Inspector-General was initiated and his interlocutory decision became subject to extensive judicial 
review proceedings.8  
The Zaoui litigation, and the subsequent public conversation, highlighted fundamental flaws in 
Part 4A of the 1987 Act; the lengthy, complex decision-making and review processes were 
unacceptable to both the Crown and the affected person,9 with inadequate human rights protections 
underlying legal argument throughout, including at the Supreme Court level.  
Zaoui also saw New Zealand's first experience with special advocates. The Inspector-General, 
under statutory authority to regulate his procedure,10 appointed a security-cleared lawyer (Stuart 
Grieve QC, later assisted by a junior) to act on Zaoui's behalf in relation to the classified 
information on review. The special advocates were able to view SIS material not previously 
disclosed to Zaoui or his legal advisers and make challenges to that material in closed 
proceedings.11 Critically, however, they could not convey to Zaoui what was contained in the 
classified material, nor receive instructions based on it.12 Unfortunately, from an academic 
perspective, the role was not ultimately tested as the Director of Security withdrew the security risk 
certificate on 13 September 2007.  
C Overseas Developments 
The special advocate brief employed by the Inspector-General in Zaoui was modelled on the 
function established in the United Kingdom following the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Chahal v United Kingdom (Chahal). 13 
In Chahal, the European Court criticised the review of detention and deportation of foreign 
nationals on the basis of national security interests by an anonymous advisory panel with no power 
of decision, whose advice to the Home Secretary was not disclosed, with no entitlement to legal 
representation for an affected person and only an outline of the grounds for deportation disclosed.14 
In response, the United Kingdom Parliament established the Special Immigration Appeal 
Commission (SIAC) to deal with immigration and asylum appeals involving national security 
  
8  Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2004] 2 NZLR 339 (HC); [2005] 1 NZLR 690 (CA); [2006] 1 NZLR 289 
(SC). 
9  See Department of Labour Immigration Act Review: Part 4A Report Back (Wellington, 2007) 6-7. 
10  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1996, s 19 incorporated into Immigration Act 1987, s 
114I(6)(b). 
11  Hon Paul Neazor, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, to the author (1 July 2008) Letter.  
12  Ibid. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413, para 130 (ECHR) Judgment of the Court. 
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issues.15  Where an appeal is likely to involve classified security information, the Attorney-General 
appoints a special advocate to represent the interests of the affected person.16 The special advocate's 
role is to challenge the classified nature of the evidence and its credibility; however it is 
significantly restricted in the latter by an almost total restriction on communication with the affected 
person and his or her legal advisors.17 
This special advocate model has also been adopted in Canada following the Supreme Court 
decision in Charkaoui v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Charkaoui).18 The Court 
concluded that the review by a Federal Court Judge of the "reasonableness" of a security risk 
certificate, conducted ex parte if disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of 
any person, denied the right to a fair hearing by not providing an effective substitute for informed 
participation when less intrusive alternatives (such as the United Kingdom's special advocate model) 
were available.19 In February 2008, the Canadian Parliament passed legislation establishing the 
special advocate function.20 
The influence of international developments in the adoption of the special advocate function in 
New Zealand is acknowledged by the explanatory note to the Bill: "These provisions [relating to the 
use of classified information] draw on current international standards and experience…".21 
III IMMIGRATION BILL 2007 
Prior to the November 2008 election, the Transport and Industrial Relations Select Committee 
reported on the Bill and recommended that it be passed.22 The Bill was reinstated by the new 
government and has now passed its second reading. 
A significant feature of the Bill is the ability of immigration decision-makers "to use classified 
information in a wider range of decision making with special safeguards."23 As the scope for the 
  
15  Treasury Solicitors Department Special Advocates: A Guide to the Role of Special Advocates and the 
Special Advocates Support Office (SASO) Open Manual (London, 2006) para 6. 
16  Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (UK), s 6. 
17  Treasury Solicitors Department, above n 15, para 108. 
18  Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2007] 1 SCR 350 [Charkaoui]. 
19  Ibid, para 87 McLachlin CJ for the Court. 
20  An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to 
make a consequential amendment to another Act S C 2008 c C-3. 
21  Immigration Bill 2007, no 132-1 (explanatory note) iii. 
22  Ibid, no 132-2 (Select Committee report). 
23  Ibid, no 132-1 (explanatory note) ii (emphasis added). 
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use of classified information is the basis for the involvement of special advocates, this is the starting 
point for my analysis. 
A Classified Information 
The extension of the use of classified information is a dramatic departure from the security risk 
certificate regime under Part 4A of the 1987 Act. 
Classified information is no longer limited to classified security information. Clause 5(1) of the 
Bill defines classified information as "information that the chief executive of a relevant agency 
certifies in writing cannot be disclosed".24 A "relevant agency" is any of 14 New Zealand 
government agencies,25 intended to encapsulate "security, defence, law enforcement, and border 
agencies, along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Internal 
Affairs".26 And, as the relevant agency is the agency "that holds, was the source of, or was provided 
with" the information, the potential sources of the information are infinitely wider.27 
The Immigration Act Review discussion paper, circulated to invite comment on the proposed 
legislation, envisaged "classified information" capturing information relating to "criminality, 
identity, or credibility generally".28 This is a significant extension from the 1987 Act, which was 
limited to classified security information: "information about the threat to security, public order, or 
public interest posed by an identifiable individual which is held by the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service".29  
The effect of this wider definition is highlighted by the grounds on which information can be 
classified. Clause 5 retains the two step test from the 1987 Act, whereby the information must be of 
a certain kind and disclosure must be likely to have a certain effect.30 Clause 5(2) provides that 
information may be classified if it might lead to the identification or provide details of the source, 
nature, content or scope of the information or assistance or operational methods available to or 
undertaken by the relevant agency, or has been provided by a foreign government, agency or 
international organisation on a confidential basis.31 Clause 5(3) provides that the disclosure of that 
  
24  Ibid, no 132-2, cl 5(1). 
25  Ibid, cl 4(1). 
26  Ibid, no 132-2 (Select Committee report) 5. 
27  Ibid, cl 4(1). 
28  Department of Labour Immigration Act Review: Discussion Paper (Wellington, 2006) para 554 [IAR: 
Discussion Paper]. 
29  Immigration Act 1987, s 114B(1). 
30  Ibid. 
31  Immigration Bill 2007, no 132-2, cl 5(2). 
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information must be likely to prejudice the security, defence or international relations of New 
Zealand, the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand or the maintenance of the 
law, or to endanger the safety of any person.32 
These grounds have not been significantly widened from the 1987 Act, except to the extent that 
this results from the wider definition of classified information. For example, under subclause (2) 
"the source, nature, content, or scope of the information…" is considerably wider once it is taken 
out of the security and intelligence context and applied to the 14 relevant agencies under clause 4(1). 
Further, subclause (3), which includes disclosure likely to "prejudice the entrusting of information to 
the New Zealand Government"; when taken out of the security and intelligence context, where New 
Zealand's national security agencies rely on foreign intelligence, the argument for non-disclosure is 
not necessarily compelling.  
Clause 30(1) then provides that "classified information may be relied on in making decisions or 
determining proceedings under this Act if the Minister determines that the classified information 
relates to matters of security or criminal conduct."33  
The Select Committee notably removed from this clause the ability to use classified information 
on the basis that it relates to "matters that may have a significant impact on New Zealand's 
international reputation".34 In doing so the Committee acknowledged concerns that such a 
justification would be subjective.35 Reputational risk, as a basis for derogating from individual 
rights, was described as "a makeweight" in the House of Lords decision of A v Secretary of State.36 
However, the definition of security under clause 4(1) is so broad as to render this deletion 
almost futile. As well as covering defence, espionage, sabotage, organised crime and terrorism, the 
definition includes "activities in or relating to New Zealand that … affect adversely New Zealand's 
international wellbeing, reputation, or economic wellbeing".37 Thus reputational harm is still 
capable of grounding the use of classified information, under the guise of "matters relating to 
security".  
Further, as participation in organised crime and terrorist activity is also covered by the definition 
of security, the inclusion of criminal conduct in clause 30(1) would cover entirely domestic, even 
minor, offending, and could extend to mere allegations.  
  
32  Ibid, cl 5(3). 
33  Ibid, cl 30(1). 
34  Ibid. 
35   Ibid, (Select Committee report) 6. 
36  A v Secretary of State [2005] 2 AC 68, para 181 (HL) Lord Rodger. 
37  Immigration Bill 2007, no 132-2, cl l4(1)(a)(iv)(C). 
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In summary, clause 30(1) provides a very wide basis for the use of classified information under 
the Bill. 
Clause 30(2) then provides that the Minister may "rely on the information to make a decision 
under Part 3, 4, or 6"38 relating to visas, entry permission and deportation respectively. The 
Minister may also direct that the information be provided to the Immigration and Protection 
Tribunal (Tribunal) or court if it is to be relied upon in any proceedings.39 In comparison, the 1987 
Act only provides for the use of classified security information (without full disclosure) under Part 
4A, that is, where a security risk certificate has been issued by the Director of Security.  
 
The wider use of classified information is proposed to cover "people who present a risk to New 
Zealand's interests, but whose risk can be managed by preventing further extensions of their stay."40 
In such cases an adverse decision may result in the affected person being in New Zealand 
unlawfully,41 and consequently liable for deportation under clause 143(1). 
While it is undoubtedly important "that immigration decisions are not made in error, or without 
full consideration of the facts",42 the issue remains that the classified evidence is not disclosed to, or 
able to be challenged by, an affected person, with potentially very serious consequences.  
B Safeguards 
In an attempt to balance the extended definition and use of classified information, the Bill 
provides for limited disclosure, appeal and review rights, and the use of special advocates.   
1 Summary and reasons  
Clauses 34 and 35 of the Bill provide for limited disclosure in relation to certain decisions 
involving classified information, including residence class visa applications, onshore temporary or 
limited visa applications, liability for deportation and decisions relating to refugee or protection 
status.43 
Clause 34(2) requires that, before a relevant decision is made in reliance on potentially 
prejudicial classified information, a summary of allegations arising from the classified information 
is to be forwarded to the affected person for comment.44 If proceedings involving classified 
 
38  Ibid, cl 30(2)(a). 
39  Ibid, cl 30(2) subparas (b) and (c). 
40  IAR: Discussion Paper, above n 28, para 564. 
41  Immigration Bill 2007, no 132-2, cl 5B(1). 
42  IAR: Discussion Paper, above n 28, para 573. 
43  Immigration Bill 2007, no 132-2, cl 34(1). 
44  Ibid, cl 34(2). 
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information go before the Tribunal, the summary must be approved by the Tribunal.45 The Select 
Committee notably amended the Bill to the effect that classified information cannot be relied on in 
making the relevant decision to the extent that the allegations arising from it cannot be 
summarised.46 
Once a decision has been made in reliance on classified information, and the decision is 
prejudicial to the affected person, clause 35 provides that he or she must be informed, inter alia, that 
classified information was relied on and of the reasons for the decision (except to the extent that this 
would involve prejudicial disclosure in terms of clause 5(3)).47  
Experience in Canada and the United Kingdom has shown such summaries to be extremely 
general, with "protective anxiety" on behalf of information sources.48 One anticipates then, that a 
summary of allegations and reasons, if available at all, will likely contain insufficient information to 
genuinely challenge the government's case. 
2 Appeal and review rights 
Part 7 of the Bill establishes the Tribunal as "a specialist Tribunal to determine appeals and 
other matters" under the Bill, replacing the four existing appeal bodies and the Inspector-General's 
review of the use of classified information.49  
Appeals to the Tribunal are principally limited to residence, protection and deportation 
determinations,50 with the notable exception of non-citizens liable for deportation by Order in 
Council as a threat to national security under clause 152.51 These "appeals" are not appeals in their 
usual sense; rather, they are de novo determinations of liability (appeals on the facts) or first 
instance considerations of humanitarian grounds that would make it unjust or unduly harsh to deport 
  
45  Ibid, cl 216(2). 
46  Ibid, cls 34(2A) and 216(2A). 
47  Ibid, cl 35. 
48  Craig Forcese and Lorne Waldman Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of "Special Advocates" in National Security Proceedings (Ottawa, 
2007) 12; Joint Committee on Human Rights "Review of Counterterrorism Powers" (21 July 2004) HL 
158/HC 713, para 22. 
49  Immigration Bill 2007, no 132-2, cl 169(b). 
50  Ibid, cls 180(1) and 185(1). 
51  Ibid, cl 185(2)(c). 
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an affected person (appeals on humanitarian grounds).52 Further appeals, on points of law only, 
from decisions of the Tribunal are available by leave to the High Court and Court of Appeal.53 
Where an "appeal" to the Tribunal is not available, judicial review in the High Court is the only 
means of independent review. This is despite the Select Committee's concern (in relation to 
residence class visa determinations) that "excluding such appeals where classified information was 
relied on would prevent appropriate independent scrutiny by the Tribunal of the veracity and 
relevance of the classified information in question."54  
Where proceedings before the Tribunal involve classified information, the Tribunal is to consist 
of up to three District Court Judges,55 and is to have access to the classified information relied on in 
the decision or first raised in the appeal or matter.56 Prior to substantively determining the appeal or 
matter, the Tribunal is to establish whether the classified information is relevant, whether it should 
be classified and whether it is credible.57  
Following Select Committee amendment, clause 194 of the Bill provides for the Tribunal's 
proceedings to be inquisitorial, adversarial or a mixture of the two, in any particular case.58 Thus 
while the Tribunal has powers of investigation,59 there is also provision in the Bill for a more 
adversarial hearing, particularly in relation to appeals against liability for deportation or proceedings 
involving refugee or protection status.  
C Special Advocates 
A special advocate under the Bill is a special security-cleared lawyer recognised as such by an 
agency designated for the purpose by the Prime Minister (designated agency).60 It is unclear at this 
stage whether a new agency will be established, or an existing agency extended, to accommodate 
this function. 
  
52  Ibid, cls 181 and 186. 
53  Ibid, cl 219. 
54  Ibid, (Select Committee report) 21. 
55  Ibid, cl 214. 
56  Ibid, cls 215 and 231(1). 
57  Ibid, cl 217. 
58  Ibid, cl 194(2). 
59  Ibid, 2nd sch, cls 11 and 12. 
60  Ibid, cl 236. 
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The role of the special advocate is to represent an affected person in proceedings involving 
classified information.61 To this end, the special advocate may lodge or commence proceedings on 
behalf of the affected person and participate in proceedings from which that person is excluded.62 
The special advocate must be provided with access to the classified information relied on in making 
the decision or provided to the Tribunal (or court).63 
The appointment of a special advocate is made by the designated agency from a list of three 
possible advocates provided to an affected person, on the choice of that affected person.64 If an 
affected person does not wish to appoint a special advocate, one will be appointed on his or her 
behalf.65 The actual and reasonable costs of the special advocate are to be met by the Department 
administering the Act.66  
Prior to gaining access to the classified information, the special advocate can communicate with 
the affected persons and their private counsel "on an unlimited basis".67 However, once access has 
been provided, the special advocate must not communicate with affected persons or their counsel, 
except in writing through the Tribunal.68 The Tribunal will either forward the communication to the 
affected person or decline to do so on the basis that the communication would likely involve 
prejudicial disclosure.69 In making this determination the Tribunal may consult with the chief 
executive of the relevant agency and/or amend the communication as necessary.70  
The only persons with whom the special advocate is able to communicate, once exposed to the 
classified information, and about any matter connected with the proceedings, are the Tribunal or 
court, the Minister or chief executive of the relevant agency, and persons with whom it is necessary 
to communicate for administrative purposes not connected with the substance of the proceeding.71  
  
61  Ibid, cl 235(1). 
62  Ibid, cl 235(2). 
63  Ibid, cls 235(3) and 238(1)(b). 
64  Ibid, cls 237(6) and (7). 
65  Ibid, cl 237(6A). 
66  Ibid, cl 235. 
67  Ibid, cl 238(1)(a). 
68  Ibid, cl 238(1)(b). 
69  Ibid, cl 238(6)(a). 
70  Ibid, cl 238(8). 
71  Ibid, cl 238(4). 
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The effectiveness of a special advocate, purporting to represent an affected person, but unable to 
get comment from him or her on anything contained in the classified information, has been the 
subject of immense criticism in both the United Kingdom and Canada.72  
While the special advocate can have unlimited contact with the affected person prior to 
disclosure of the classified information, the utility of this provision has been questioned.73 At that 
stage all are acting effectively in ignorance of the core government case, as the unclassified 
evidence may have little or no relation to the classified evidence and little assistance may be gained 
from the summary of evidence. Special advocates in the United Kingdom have also expressed 
concern that, as the SIAC (or Tribunal, in New Zealand's case) may consult with the relevant agency 
in determining whether or not a special advocate's communication with the affected person is 
appropriate, the agency will be alerted to a line of investigation. This places the affected person at a 
tactical disadvantage, and any decision not to pursue that line at the hearing may be viewed 
adversely.  
The restriction on communication also precludes information sharing between special advocates, 
diminishing their capacity to identify inconsistent use of classified material between cases.74 
Arguably, effective special advocate work in a common law system depends on access to precedent 
in closed matters.75 
Following their study of special advocates in the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand (in 
Zaoui), Forcese and Waldham conclude that the possibility of a full answer and defence is basically 
non-existent without the ability to offer an exculpatory explanation of the sort that can only be 
derived from the affected person.76 Lord Bingham, dissenting in Roberts v Parole Board (Roberts), 
also describes the special advocate as inevitably "taking blind shots at a hidden target."77 
This position obviously raises significant concerns about the right to a fair hearing. 
  
72  See Forcese and Waldham, above n 48; Joint Committee on Human Rights, above n 48; House of Commons 
Constitutional Affairs Committee "The Operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) 
and the use of Special Advocates" (3 April 2005) HC 323-1. 
73  Forcese and Waldham, above n 48, 34. 
74  Ibid, 29. 
75  Ibid. 
76  Ibid, 39. 
77  Roberts v Parole Board [2005] 2 AC 738, para 18 (HL) Lord Bingham dissenting. 
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IV ANALYSIS 
A Human Rights Framework  
1 Fair hearing rights 
Non-disclosure of evidence challenges a basic premise of the right to a fair hearing: the right to 
be heard. In Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya, the Privy Council held that:78 
If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the 
accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given 
and what statements have been made affecting him: and then he must be given a fair opportunity to 
correct or contradict them… It follows, of course, that the judge or whoever has to adjudicate must not 
hear evidence or receive representations from one side behind the back of the other. 
The strongest protections for the right to be heard are contained in section 25 of the Bill of 
Rights Act, which reads, in part:79 
Everyone who is charged with an offence has … the following minimum rights: 
(a)  The right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court: … 
(e)  The right to be present at the trial and to present a defence: … 
(f) The right to examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses for the defence under the same conditions as the prosecution. 
However, advice to the Attorney General on the Bill states: "we do not consider that sections 24 
and 25 of [the Bill of Rights Act] are engaged on the basis that they deal with criminal procedure 
and those who have been charged with an offence."80 
This has also been the prominent view of the courts. The Court of Appeal in Zaoui v Attorney-
General (No 1), regarding bail, held that section 24 was only available to those charged with a 
criminal offence and could not be relied upon by Zaoui, who was in immigration detention.81 
In Canada, early challenges to the security certificate review procedure failed on a similar basis. 
In Ahani v Canada, the Federal Court held that the plaintiff's argument that the lack of disclosure 
  
78  Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] AC 322, 337 (PC) Lord Denning for the Court. 
79  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25. 
80  J Orr and M Dugdale "Consistency with the New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990: Immigration Bill" 
(advice to the Attorney-General) (20 July 2007) para 147.  
81  Zaoui v Attorney-General [2005] 1 NZLR 577, para 267 (CA) O'Regan J. The practical significance of this 
ruling was diminished by the Supreme Court's decision that there is a common law right to bail that can be 
invoked by all detained persons regardless of the reason for their detention. 
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and opportunity to challenge the information against him was a violation of the principles of 
fundamental justice was based on criminal law principles that had no application in his immigration 
case.82 
This position is problematic as immigration measures are often used to detain or deport those 
suspected of involvement in criminal activities, allowing them to be dealt with on an administrative 
basis without the procedural protections they would be afforded if actually charged.83 Further, an 
adverse immigration determination could potentially result in graver consequences than those 
permitted at criminal law, including prolonged detention or deportation to persecution or worse. 
These concerns can claim some support from the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in 
Charkaoui, where the Court held that, in determining whether protections contained in the Canadian 
Charter apply, courts "must look at the interests at stake rather than the legal label attached to the 
impugned legislation."84  
Similarly, in Engel v Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights held that, in 
determining whether the specific rights for those charged with a criminal offence in Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) applied, courts had jurisdiction to look beyond the 
classification given to an offence to "satisfy itself that the disciplinary does not improperly encroach 
upon the criminal".85  
The above arguments were considered by the House of Lords in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v MB and AF (MB), concerning the application of Article 6 to "control order" 
proceedings (which also involved the use of special advocates where classified information was 
relied upon).86 Here, the affected persons, reasonably suspected of involvement in terrorist-related 
activity, were subject to restrictions on their place of residence, movement, activities, 
communications, and associations, and were required to allow searches of themselves and theirs 
residence, and to wear electronic monitoring equipment, at all times.87 
  
82  Ahani v Canada [1995] 3 FC 669, 694 and 696 (FCC) McGillis J. 
83  John Ip "Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist Suspects" (2007) 16 Transnat'l L & 
Contemp Probs 773, 810 and 823-4; Parliamentary Information and Research Service "Bill C-3: An Act to 
Amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Certificate and Special Advocate) and to make a 
consequential amendment to another Act" (2 November 2007) LS-567E, 2 fn 3. 
84  Charkaoui, above n 18, para 18 McLachlin CJ for the Court. 
85  Engel v Netherlands (8 June 1976) ECHR 5100/71, para 81 Judgment of the Court. 
86  Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB and AF [2008] 1 AC 440 (HL) [MB]. 
87  Ibid, para 7 Lord Bingham. 
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Although their Lordships held that such proceedings did not qualify as "criminal", as there was 
only an assertion of suspicion of criminal conduct, and the control order was preventative, rather 
than punitive or retributive, in purpose,88 Lord Bingham observed that:89 
…judges have regarded the classification of proceedings as criminal or civil as less important than the 
question of what protections are required for a fair trial… and have held that the gravity and complexity 
of the charges and of the defence will impact on what fairness requires.  
A similar approach has been taken in New Zealand. The relationship between sections 24, 25 
and 27 was briefly discussed by the Court of Appeal in Drew v Attorney General (Drew),90 
concerning the right of a serving prisoner to be represented by a lawyer at an appeal hearing for a 
disciplinary offence before a Visiting Justice.  While it was ultimately left open whether sections 24 
and 25 applied, the Court of Appeal recognised that there were arguments for such an application.91 
The Court did not have to decide this point as the lack of legal representation in Mr Drew's case 
constituted a breach of the common law principles of natural justice, as affirmed by section 27(1) of 
the Bill of Rights Act.92 
At the very least then courts can look to the guarantees contained in section 25 of the Bill of 
Rights Act to inform the minimum standards applicable in any particular case under section 27(1) 
and the common law principles of natural justice.  
2 Natural justice 
The common law concept of natural justice requires administrative bodies to act fairly when 
reaching a decision that could adversely affect those who are the subject of the decision.93 The 
Privy Council in Furnell v Whangarei High Schools Board described natural justice as "fairness writ 
large and juridically" and "fair play in action".94 
 
The content of the rules and the standards imposed by natural justice are infinitely flexible, and 
"must depend upon the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which 
the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth."95 "The overriding 
 
88  Ibid, para 24 Lord Bingham. 
89  Ibid, para 17 Lord Bingham. 
90  Drew v Attorney-General [2002] 1 NZLR 58 (CA) [Drew]. 
91  Ibid, para 76 Richardson P, Keith, Blanchard and Tipping JJ. 
92  Ibid, para 79 Richardson P, Keith, Blanchard and Tipping JJ. 
93  William Wade and Christopher Forsyth (eds) Administrative Law (9 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2004) 494. 
94  Furnell v Whangarei High Schools Board [1973] 2 NZLR 705, 718 (PC) Lord Morris. 
95  Russell v Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All ER 109, 118 (CA) Tucker LJ. 
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requirement is that the guiding principles should be respected and observed… the touchstone is to 
ascertain what justice requires in the circumstances of the particular case."96  
One such guiding principle is the right to notice and the opportunity to be heard in respect of 
matters which might be considered in the course of a decision affecting a person's rights or 
interests.97 
At common law, the requirements of natural justice are determined by statutory interpretation 
and supplementation. Where an empowering statute omits express protection of procedural fairness, 
"the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature".98 And where Parliament 
does confer statutory protections, but these are insufficient, courts may supplement that procedure 
by reference to natural justice, provided that this does not frustrate the apparent purpose of the 
legislation.99 As common law natural justice rests upon statutory implication, its application "must 
always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act."100 
The right to observance of the principles of natural justice is affirmed by section 27(1) of the 
Bill of Rights Act: 
Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice by any tribunal or other 
public authority which has the power to make a determination in respect of that person's rights, 
obligations or interests protected or recognised by law. 
In Combined Beneficiaries Union v Auckland City COGS Committee (CBU), the Court of 
Appeal confirmed that:101 
the content of the s 27(1) right to natural justice was intended to be and is (at least) coincident with that 
at common law (although, as at common law, that would not limit later development of the right). This 
is supported by the plain words of the provision, the legislative history and the policy of the Bill of 
Rights. 
However, the Bill of Rights Act also adds a normative, evaluative character, allowing courts to 
consider the extent to which natural justice ought to apply, notwithstanding the particular statutory 
procedure.102 The Court of Appeal in CBU affirmed the statement in the Bill of Rights White Paper 
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that "s[ection] 27(1) will not change the courts' normal and long-standing task, except to the extent 
that the principles [of natural justice] will now have an enhanced status."103 
In summary, section 27(1) will provide the framework for my analysis, but case law as to the 
determination of "the principles of natural justice" at common law will necessarily be utilised, to the 
extent that this is consistent with the normative affirmation of those principles in the Bill of Rights 
Act. 
3 Section 5 Bill of Rights Act 
In the context of natural justice it is unclear whether the additional balancing of section 5 of the 
Bill of Rights Act is required. Section 5 provides for "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."104  
The Court of Appeal in Drew observed that "as natural justice is itself a flexible concept which 
adapts to particular situations, where its principles apply there is no room and no need for the 
operation of section 5."105 This is supported by the conceptual view that, as natural justice is about 
minimum standards, it would be counterintuitive to further limit those standards.106  
However, there is little consensus, or authority, on this point. The counterview is that human 
rights require a generous interpretation, with limits carefully and transparently analysed under 
section 5, in accordance with the framework set out by the Bill of Rights Act.107 This position has 
support from the Supreme Court of Canada, which held in Charkaoui that, unlike section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter (the equivalent of section 5),  section 7 is not concerned with whether a limit on 
life, liberty or security is justified, but with whether the limit has been imposed in a way that 
respects the principles of fundamental justice.108 
In the interests of clarity, and the absence of settled authority to the contrary, this article 
analyses the Bill in terms of both section 27(1) and section 5.  
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104  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
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B The Right to be Heard 
1 Is section 27(1) engaged? 
For section 27(1) to be engaged, an affected person must be subject to "a determination", "by 
any tribunal or other public authority", "in respect of that person's rights, obligations or interests 
protected or recognised by law".109 
As previously discussed, classified evidence may be used by the Minister, Tribunal or courts, in 
determinations regarding visas, entry permission, deportation, warrants of commitment and 
protection status, where the classified information relates to matters of security or criminal 
conduct.110  
The Court of Appeal in CBU accepted that "the expression [in section 27(1)] "any tribunal or 
other public authority" can be read as a shorthand reference back to those identified in s 3 of the Bill 
of Rights which sets out the actors to whom the Bill of Rights applies."111 Section 3 provides that: 
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done— 
(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government of New Zealand; or ... 
The Minister, the Tribunal and courts clearly fall within section 3(a), as members of the 
executive and judicial branches of the government of New Zealand.  
The Court of Appeal in CBU also held that:112 
S[ection] 27(1) cannot, without robbing it of much of its force, be read as dealing only with actual 
rights, obligations or interests. It must also extend at least as far as claimed rights, obligations and 
interests. There is no reason in principle why it should not also extend to discretionary determinations. A 
discretion, if exercised in favour of the applicant, can result in a right. 
In support of this contention, the Court noted the decision of the Supreme Court in Udompun v 
Minister of Immigration and New Zealand Police,113 refusing leave to appeal against a decision 
concerning alleged breaches of section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights Act in the course of refusing entry 
to New Zealand.114 The Supreme Court found that each of the proposed grounds of appeal entailed 
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488 (2009) 40 VUWLR 
an application of uncontentious principle to the facts: apparently accepting that section 27(1) applies 
to entry decisions at the border, even though there is no "right" of entry.115  
In Dayaganasi v Minister of Immigration, Cooke J (as he then was) similarly held that, 
concerning the application of natural justice to a limited appeal from automatic deportation 
liability:116 
The present is not a case of an entrenched right, but if the Minister decides the specific and quite 
narrowly-worded question in the appellant's favour and consequently orders that the appellant be not 
deported, the Act requires him to issue a permit. So it seems to me by no means a distortion of language 
to say that the Minister is determining a question affecting the rights of an individual. 
This reasoning would equally apply to determinations of deportation liability, residence and 
protection status, being the determinations affecting the right of an individual to remain in New 
Zealand, and on what terms.  
The engagement of section 27(1) entitles affected persons "to the observance of the principles of 
natural justice", the requirements of which depend in particular on the interests at stake and the 
nature of the proceedings.  
2 Requirements 
Lord Woolf in Roberts v Parole Board held that "the [affected person] should have the benefit 
of a procedure which fairly reflects, on the facts of his particular case, the importance of what is at 
stake for him, as for society."117  
In cases involving immigration status, Elias J (as she then was) held in Ali v Deportation Review 
Tribunal that "high standards of fairness are required by natural justice because of the profound 
implications for the lives of those affected."118 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui also emphasised that:119 
It is one thing to deprive a person of full information where fingerprinting is at stake, and quite another 
to deny him or her of information where the consequences are removal from the country or indefinite 
detention.  
  
115  Ibid; Udompun v Minister of Immigration and New Zealand Police, above n 113, para 7 Judgment of the 
Court. 
116  Dayaganasi v Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130, 144 (CA) Cooke J. 
117  Roberts v Parole Board, above n 77, para 46 Lord Woolf. 
118  Ali v Deportation Review Tribunal [1997] NZAR 208, 220 (HC) Elias J. 
119 Charkaoui, above n 18, para 60 McLachlin CJ for the Court. 
 IMMIGRATION BILL 2007: SPECIAL ADVOCATES AND THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD 489 
The Supreme Court was particularly concerned with the possibility of grave consequences 
resulting from deportation, highlighted in the case of refugees and protected persons.120 
Unsurprisingly, additional protections from deportation liability are provided for refugees and 
protected persons under the Bill. 
A refugee is a person who "owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted … is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country."121 A refugee or refugee status claimant may be deported only if Article 
32.1 or 33 of the Refugee Convention allows the deportation of the person,122 that is, on the 
grounds of national security or public order or as a danger to national security or the community. 
 
A protected person is a person of whom there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture, arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if 
deported from New Zealand.123 A protected person may only be deported to a place other than a 
place in respect of which the above risk applies.124  
Thus establishing and maintaining refugee or protected person status is of principal importance 
in protecting serious life and liberty interests.  
Other determinations also have potentially serious consequences: including warrant of 
commitment, deportation, and residence proceedings. The serious nature of the interests at stake is 
reflected in the Bill's provision for first instance or de novo determinations by the Tribunal of 
protection, residence and deportation proceedings (with the exception of clause 152 liability), and 
warrant of commitment proceedings in the District Court. 
The essentially adversarial nature of these proceedings requires stronger protection of natural 
justice. Upjohn LJ in Re K (Infants) held that:125  
It seems to be fundamental to any judicial inquiry that a person or other properly interested party must 
have the right to see all the information put before the judge, to comment on it, to challenge it and if 
needs be to combat it, and to try to establish by contrary evidence that it is wrong. It cannot be withheld 
from him in whole or in part. 
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It was also material to the Court of Appeal decision in Drew that the role of the Visiting 
Justice:126  
is predominantly that of an adjudicator required to make a decision on the evidence presented by the 
prison authorities and the inmate. The process has the usual hallmarks of an adversarial contest to 
which the principles of natural justice apply – the laying of a charge to be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt, the calling of evidence by the parties at a hearing and the right to cross-examine. The adjudicator 
is not empowered to conduct his or her investigations outside the hearing.  
In respect of assistance given by the Justice to inmates, the Court of Appeal concluded that "at 
most, there is a slight inquisitorial element, but the task remains fundamentally one of adjudication 
between the cases which the parties have chosen to present."127 
Proceedings involving classified information will generally rest upon an allegation of 
participation in criminal, terrorist, or other subversive activity, rendering the affected person's 
presence in New Zealand contrary to the public interest. This will require the production and 
examination of evidence, and legal argument regarding this, akin to criminal or serious disciplinary 
proceedings. 
This is most significant in respect of a clause 152 determination that an affected person is a 
threat to national security: a serious allegation with potentially very serious consequences, allowing 
the deportation of a refugee despite an acknowledged risk of persecution. While this particular 
determination is not afforded an "appeal" to the Tribunal, the seriousness of this allegation and its 
consequences must require a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the Minister, in the first 
instance, and the court in judicial review proceedings. 
The Tribunal will have the opportunity to review, de novo, evidence presented in respect of 
deportation and residence proceedings, and to make first instance determinations of protection status 
and humanitarian grounds rendering deportation unjust or unduly harsh to an affected person. The 
District Court will determine, at first instance, liability for detention under a warrant of 
commitment. Again, in each case, the production and examination of evidence, and legal argument 
concerning this, will be crucial and potentially complex. 
In respect of the Tribunal, while the Bill provides for certain powers of investigation,128 there is 
no duty on the Minister or relevant agency to provide to the Tribunal any classified information 
other than that which "was relied on" in making the decision or first raised in the appeal or matter 
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before the Tribunal.129 Further, the use of special advocates and the provision for oral hearings 
demonstrates a commitment to a more adversarial proceeding where serious interests are at stake.130 
The ordinary courts, on review, on appeal, and in respect of warrant of commitment 
proceedings, are similarly only provided with the classified information which "was relied on", in an 
even plainer adversarial context.  
At the same time, a special advocate, while representing the interests of an affected person, is 
unable to take instructions from that person in relation to the classified information and has no 
express power under the Bill to request other government records believed to be relevant. Disclosure 
is highly unlikely to be complete; even acting in utmost good faith, the "protective anxiety" of 
intelligence agencies produces a different view as to what is relevant from that of a legal 
advocate.131 Further, special advocates in the United Kingdom report that often they only receive 
analytical summaries or assessments prepared by the security services, which quote from intercepted 
materials or other summaries, rather than actual transcriptions of intercepted communications.132 
This increases the risk that the information is selective and at the very least deprives the special 
advocate of the full context of recorded conversations. Thus while the proceedings are adversarial, 
the protection afforded by this process is severely constrained. 
In Charkaoui, it was material to the Supreme Court's decision that the reviewing judges of the 
Federal Court:133 
do not possess the full and independent powers to gather evidence that exist in an inquisitorial process. 
At the same time, the named person is not given the disclosure and the right to participate in the 
proceedings that characterize the adversarial process. The result is a concern that the judge, despite his 
or her best efforts to get all the relevant evidence, may be obliged - perhaps unknowingly - to make the 
required decision based on only part of the relevant evidence. 
The risk is also present here that the Tribunal or court will not have all the information before 
them. There is a heavy burden on the special advocate to present the affected person's case, with 
insufficient ability to actually do so. 
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It is nonetheless accepted, however, that a balancing of competing public interests may 
nonetheless require the withholding of information from one of the parties. 
In Re K, the House of Lords held that the disclosure of confidential reports was a matter of 
discretion for the judge.134 The decisive factor was that the High Court was exercising wardship 
jurisdiction: its paramount consideration was the welfare of the child.135 Lord Devlin drew a 
distinction between ordinary adversarial proceedings in which natural justice must prevail and 
exceptional cases where other interests may have to be protected:136  
Where the judge sits purely as an arbiter and relies on the parties for his information, the parties have a 
correlative right that he should act only on information which they have had the opportunity of testing. 
Where the judge is not sitting purely, or even primarily, as an arbiter but is charged with the paramount 
duty of protecting the interests of one outside the conflict, a rule that is designed for just arbitrament 
cannot in all circumstances prevail. 
Similarly in Roberts, Lord Woolf held it was "particularly important" that "in the final balance, 
the [parole] board is bound to give preponderant weight to the need to protect innocent members of 
the public against any significant risk of serious injury".137 Lord Woolf concluded that measures 
necessary to protect the public interest were not necessarily inconsistent with achieving the "core, 
irreducible, minimum entitlement" of natural justice.138 
And in R v H, the use of special advocates in criminal discovery proceedings concerning the 
doctrine of public interest immunity, enabled the court to reconcile "an individual defendant's right 
to a fair trial with such secrecy as is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or the prevention or investigation of crime".139 
There is a strong case that the Tribunal or court, in respect of proceedings involving classified 
information, are under a paramount duty to prevent the prejudicial disclosure of sensitive 
information, whilst enabling the removal from New Zealand of potentially dangerous individuals.  
While these national security concerns mean that the right to be heard can not be absolute, none 
of the authorities mentioned above apply a consistent rule of non-disclosure. In Re K, the disclosure, 
or not, of confidential reports was a matter of discretion for the Judge.140 In Roberts, Lord Woolf 
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held that the minimum entitlement of natural justice cannot be determined in the abstract; there must 
be a balancing exercise on the facts of the particular case.141 And in R v H, non-disclosure and the 
appointment of a special advocate in criminal discovery proceedings, "will always be exceptional, 
never automatic; a course of last and never first resort."142  
Even where non-disclosure is warranted, the ability of a special advocate to counterbalance the 
disadvantage to an affected person, will vary greatly between cases. 
As a result, a majority of the House of Lords in MB emphasised that the compliance of control 
order proceedings, involving the use of special advocates, with the right to a fair hearing had to be 
determined on a case by case basis.143 Baroness Hale explained that:144 
[Compliance] would all depend upon the nature of the case; what steps had been taken to explain the 
detail of the allegations to the controlled person so that he could anticipate what the material in support 
might be; what steps had been taken to summarise the closed material in support without revealing 
names, dates or places; the nature and content of the material withheld; how effectively the special 
advocate had been able to challenge it on behalf of the controlled person; and what difference its 
disclosure might have made. All of these factors would be relevant to whether the controlled person had 
been "given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis" for the order. 
Accordingly, the provision of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) for the non-disclosure 
of classified information, was "read down", by including the qualification "except where to do so 
would be incompatible with the right of the controlled person to a fair trial".145 
The importance of "the facts" has been aptly illustrated in two recent decisions involving Abu 
Qatada, a refugee residing in the United Kingdom, alleged to be heavily involved in terrorist 
activities associated with al'Qaeda.146  
In RB v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the House of Lords dismissed Abu 
Qatada's (and others') challenge to the special advocate procedure used in determining their liability 
for deportation.147 While their Lordships acknowledged that an affected person's "ability to defend 
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him will be seriously impaired, if not totally destroyed, if he is not told the case against him, and his 
special advocate may well be in no position to rebut the case against him without obtaining the 
suspect's response to the closed material";148 in that case, the classified evidence in issue related to 
"safety on return", and an affected person:149 
will normally be aware of those facts and indeed he will be relying on them to establish the risk that he 
faces on his return. His situation is not that of an individual who is unaware of the case that is made 
against him. 
Accordingly, Lord Phillips concluded that, "when the relevant factors are weighed in the balance 
they do not persuade me that the use of closed material in relation to the issue of safety on return 
will necessarily render the process unfair".150 And, more generally, "no requirement has been 
demonstrated to read down [the provision for non-disclosure] in order to accommodate situations 
where the use of closed material in relation to safety on return will conflict with the procedural 
requirements of the Convention".151 
The following day Abu Qatada's (and others') challenge to the special advocate procedure for 
security risk certification (and resulting detention) was partially successful in the European Court of 
Human Rights in A v United Kingdom.152 Having accepted that "there may be restrictions on the 
right to a fully adversarial procedure where strictly necessary in the light of a strong countervailing 
public interest", the Court emphasised that "there will not be a fair trial, however, unless any 
difficulties caused to the defendant by a limitation on his rights are sufficiently counterbalanced by 
the procedures followed by the judicial authorities."153 In a similar vein to MB, the Court held 
that:154 
…the special advocate could perform an important role in counterbalancing the lack of full disclosure 
and the lack of a full, open, adversarial hearing by testing the evidence and putting arguments on behalf 
of the detainee during the closed hearings. However, the special advocate could not perform this 
function in any useful way unless the detainee was provided with sufficient information about the 
allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions to the special advocate.   
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Deciding this issue on the facts of this case, the Court held that:155 
…the open material against the sixth, seventh, eighth [Mr Qatada], ninth and eleventh applicants 
included detailed allegations about, for example, the purchase of specific telecommunications 
equipment, possession of specific documents linked to named terrorist suspects and meetings with 
named terrorist suspects with specific dates and places. It considers that these allegations were 
sufficiently detailed to permit the applicants effectively to challenge them. 
In contrast:156 
The principal allegations against the first and tenth applicants were that they had been involved in fund-
raising for terrorist groups linked to al'Qaeda. … However, in each case the evidence which allegedly 
provided the link between the money raised and terrorism was not disclosed to either applicant. In these 
circumstances, the Court does not consider that these applicants were in a position effectively to 
challenge the allegations against them. 
And:157 
The open allegations in respect of the third and fifth applicants were of a general nature, principally that 
they were members of named extremist Islamist groups linked to al'Qaeda. SIAC observed in its 
judgments dismissing each of these applicants' appeals that the open evidence was insubstantial and that 
the evidence on which it relied against them was largely to be found in the closed material. Again, the 
Court does not consider that these applicants were in a position effectively to challenge the allegations 
against them. 
Thus a consistent rule of non-disclosure and the use of special advocates removes the ability of 
the decision-maker to balance the public interest in disclosure and the public interest in non-
disclosure, and to determine whether or not a special advocate can effectively challenge the 
government's case. Chahal, Charkaoui, MB and A v United Kingdom all make it clear that, even 
where national security interests are in play, an affected person must still be afforded "a substantial 
measure or degree of procedural justice".158  
While it is accepted that, in the immigration context, the requirements of due process protection 
will be lower than in criminal or severe deprivation of liberty cases, there remains situations where 
the gravity of the potential consequences for an affected person will require high standards of 
procedural fairness. The Bill provides for the use of classified information in warrant of 
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commitment proceedings, for prolonged detention, the deportation of residents who may have lived 
in New Zealand for a significant amount of time and built a life here, and of course in determining 
risk to national security, which would allow a refugee to be returned to a country despite an 
acknowledged risk of persecution. In such cases the potential consequences for an affected person 
are serious.  
In light of the Bill's substantial extension of the use of classified information in immigration 
decision-making, it seems that special advocates have been included to justify a reduction in 
procedural protection, rather than to mitigate a disadvantage to which an affected person would 
otherwise be subject. And, even where non-disclosure is necessary, the special advocate procedure 
cannot invariably be guaranteed to safeguard an affected person against significant injustice.159 
Accordingly, the author concludes that the special advocate procedure is insufficient protection 
for an affected person's right to be heard, in light of the potentially serious interests at stake. The 
question remains, however, whether this breach is justified under section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act 
1990. 
C Justified? 
Tipping J in Hansen describes a section 5 analysis as "essentially an inquiry into whether a 
justified end is achieved by proportionate means."160 More specifically, the purpose for which the 
right is limited must be sufficiently important and the limiting measure rationally connected with 
that purpose.161  Further, the measure must not impair the right more than is reasonably necessary 
to achieve that purpose and there must be proportionality between the effects of the limiting 
measure and its objective.162  
 
Tipping J also emphasises, however, that section 5 "is just as much an instruction to Parliament 
as it is to the Courts",163 and accordingly:164  
the Court's function is not immutably to substitute its own view for that of the legislature. … If the Court 
does not agree [with the legislature], it must nevertheless ask itself whether the legislature was entitled 
… to come to the conclusion under challenge. It is only if it was not so entitled that the Court should 
find the limit to be unjustified. 
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1 Importance of the objective and rational connection 
Non-disclosure of classified information, and the use of special advocates, is intended to protect 
national security and public safety. In particular, the Bill seeks to enable the deportation of 
potentially dangerous or undesirable individuals, without jeopardising intelligence sources or 
methods. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui recognised that "one of the most fundamental 
responsibilities of a government is to ensure the security of its citizens."165 Consequently, the 
protection of Canada's national security and related intelligence sources justified departure from fair 
hearing standards.166  
Like Canada, and perhaps more so, New Zealand "is a net importer of security information."167 
This information is essential to national security and disclosure may adversely affect its flow and 
quality. Lord Carlile, independent reviewer of United Kingdom anti-terrorism legislation, argues:168 
…national security could be at risk if certain types of evidence were revealed to the detainees. At risk 
too would be some individuals' lives. The kind of evidence I have in mind includes that provided by … 
"informants", disclosure of locations used for observation, details of technical facilities available for 
listening to and/or reading communications, descriptions and identities of police officers and others. 
Similar concerns were discussed by Lord Bingham in R v H:169 
the effective investigation and prosecution of serious crime, … may involve resort to informers and 
undercover agents, or the use of scientific or operational techniques (such as surveillance) which cannot 
be disclosed without exposing individuals to the risk of personal injury or jeopardising the success of 
future operations. 
Disclosure also has potential risks for intelligence-sharing arrangements, as was dramatically 
highlighted in the case of Mohamed v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.170 
Here the English High Court faced a claim of public interest immunity in respect of "seven very 
short paragraphs" summarising classified evidence "highly material" to allegations of torture, 
intended to be included in the Court's open judgment on related proceedings.171 The basis for 
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immunity was an alleged threat by the United States that, if the information was made public, it 
would "re-evaluate" its intelligence sharing relationship with the United Kingdom.172 
The High Court expressed its disbelief that:173 
…a democratically elected and accountable government could possibly have any rational objection to 
placing into the public domain such a summary of what its own officials reported as to how a detainee 
was treated by them and which made no disclosure of sensitive intelligence matters. Indeed we did not 
consider that a democracy governed by the rule of law would expect a court in another democracy to 
suppress a summary of the evidence contained in reports by its own officials or officials of another State 
where the evidence was relevant to allegations of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
politically embarrassing though it might be. 
However, the Court was faced with "powerful evidence" from the Foreign Secretary that 
"intelligence is shared on the basis of a reciprocal understanding that the confidence in and control 
over it will always be retained by the State that provides it",174 and that, without this understanding, 
"intelligence from the United States and other foreign governments so important to national security 
might not be provided."175 The Court also accepted that, "the consequences of a reconsideration of 
and a potential reduction in the information supplied by the United States under the shared 
intelligence relationship at this time would be grave indeed."176 
Thus, despite its outrage at the United States' position, the High Court held that, on balance, "it 
would not …be in the public interest to expose the United Kingdom to what the Foreign Secretary 
still considers to be the real risk of the loss of intelligence so vital to the safety of our day to day 
life."177  
It is clear then, that national security concerns for the protection of security intelligence 
operations and important intelligence-sharing arrangements are "pressing and substantial in a free 
and democratic society",178 and therefore of sufficient importance to warrant limitation on the right 
to be heard.  
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However, not all classified information capable of being used in immigration decision-making 
under the Bill compromises security or serious criminal intelligence operations and sources, or 
compromises these operations and sources to the same extent. To constitute a justifiable limitation, a 
limiting measure must be carefully designed to meet the objective in question.179 
As discussed previously, classified information is no longer restricted to classified security 
information, instead covering a wide range of information types and sources. The argument of 
protection of intelligence sources and methods does not seem to carry the same weight when it is 
applied to all of the 14 relevant agencies under clause 4(1).  
Nor is the use of classified information provided for in clause 30 restricted to concerns for 
"national security". Security is given a wide definition, including "the protection of New Zealand 
from activities in or relating to New Zealand that affect adversely New Zealand's international 
wellbeing, reputation…".180 While security, in the current international climate, requires broad 
categorisation, activities carrying reputational risk do not warrant the same treatment as espionage, 
sabotage, organised crime and terrorism.   
Further, as participation in transnational crime and terrorist activities are both easily covered by 
the definition of security itself, the inclusion of criminal conduct in clause 30(1) may cover entirely 
domestic, and is not limited to serious or substantiated, offending.  
The connection of minor, and mere allegations of, domestic criminal offending to the national 
security and public safety objectives of non-disclosure is tenuous, and raises considerable issues as 
to minimal impairment and the overall question of proportionality, discussed below. 
2 Minimal impairment  
While impairment of the right "as little as possible" was not intended to be an absolute, literal, 
requirement, any limitation must be no more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose.181 
Therefore, if Parliament might have sufficiently achieved its national security and public safety 
objectives by another method involving less cost to the right to be heard, the proposed limitation on 
disclosure will not be justified.182  
The Bill's provision for non-disclosure of classified information and the use of special advocates 
could be substantially improved and, accordingly, the disadvantage to an affected person 
significantly reduced, without cost to the national security and public safety objectives of non-
disclosure.  
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For example: 
(a) Communication 
The almost complete restriction on communication once the special advocate has become privy 
to the classified information is perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the special advocate 
function. 
The communication rules reflect the government's concern for inadvertent disclosure: 
information conveyed to the named person through the questions asked. The Select Committee 
explains: "we are told that this clause is necessary to prevent classified information being 
inadvertently released."183 
Parliamentary committees in the United Kingdom have strongly argued in favour of a relaxation 
of the restriction on communication.184 The Joint Committee on Human Rights states: "in our view 
it is essential, if Special Advocates are to be able to perform their function, that there is greater 
opportunity than currently exists for communication between the Special Advocate and the 
controlled person."185 The Committee raised the suggestion that inadvertent disclosure could be 
prevented by the presence of someone from the Special Advocates Support Office (SASO) 
recording any meetings and it admitted that some topics would be more capable than others of being 
discussed.186 This proposition has support from the Canadian Senate Special Committee: "he or she 
might communicate with the client in the company of another person, likewise sworn to secrecy, so 
that there can be close monitoring of what is discussed and inadvertent errors of disclosure 
prevented."187 
A similar communication procedure is already utilised by the Canadian Security and 
Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) although, notably, was not adopted by the Canadian 
legislature following Charkaoui. SIRC is a body of individuals appointed by the Governor-in-
Council to review the Canadian SIS.188 Prior to 2002, if the government sought to remove a 
permanent resident on national security grounds, a report on the grounds for inadmissibility of that 
affected person would be issued to SIRC to investigate the report's accuracy.189 SIRC members 
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were provided with all the information relied upon and broad powers to subpoena persons and 
documents.190 Importantly, SIRC counsel were able to maintain contact with the affected person 
and his or her counsel throughout the process, subject only to an obligation to prevent prejudicial 
disclosure.191 According to Forcese and Waldham:192 
this questioning, done in an oblique manner to avoid involuntary disclosures of secret information, is 
central in unearthing potentially exculpatory information … We were told that neither SIRC inhouse or 
outside counsel have ever received any complaints from the government that this contact with the named 
person has resulted in an involuntary disclosure injurious to national security. 
Forcese and Waldham argue that there is simply no reason to presume that special advocates are 
more prone to involuntary disclosure than government lawyers or security service interviewers, and 
that the skills obtained in years of work as a barrister adequately equip the special advocate to steer 
around such disclosure.193 
It is difficult to draw a conclusion on this issue with only a limited knowledge of the nature of 
the information and the risk of inadvertent disclosure. However it does seem that the communication 
restriction requires further consideration and the claim that it is necessary be thoroughly tested. 
(b) Information 
As discussed previously, the disadvantage to the affected person of non-disclosure is further 
compounded by the risk that the decision maker or reviewer will not have all the information before 
them. This risk could be reduced by increasing the resources and investigative powers of the special 
advocates.  
In the United Kingdom special advocates are supported by the SASO, a branch of the Treasury 
Solicitor's Department. SASO includes lawyers split between an "open" team and a "closed" 
team.194 The latter have access to the classified material while the former deal with affected persons 
and their legal advisors. Special advocates with experience under the SASO system and the less 
formal and under-resourced system prior to SASO claim this is a significant improvement.195  
In contrast, the Bill does not detail the role the "designated agency" will fulfil in relation to the 
special advocate, other than those points previously mentioned. Without full resourcing, the 
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inequality of arms between the government and the special advocate will render the latter simply 
token. 
Further, while the Bill provides for communication with persons for administrative purposes, 
this communication can not be connected to the substance of the proceedings.196 This not only 
restricts the availability of substantive support, it also precludes special advocates from obtaining 
expert, and other, evidence.  
The lack of investigative or forensic tools available to the special advocates is a serious 
limitation. In order to effectively challenge the substantive claims against the affected person, a 
special advocate needs the ability to seek and obtain other governmental records believed to be 
relevant, and obtain expert evidence, in order to detect gaps, inconsistencies and weaknesses in the 
government's case.197 
In the United Kingdom, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 
require the Secretary of State to "make a reasonable search for exculpatory material", and must file 
any material discovered with the Commission.198 This exculpatory material must then be served on 
the affected person, unless this would not be in the public interest, in which case it is served on the 
special advocate.199 
An enforceable duty on the part of the Crown to provide the special advocate with all relevant 
classified information, or at least all relevant exculpatory material, would strengthen the position of 
the Tribunal or court to determine an affected person's case in full light of the relevant facts.200 
While "protective anxiety" may still work against full disclosure, there would at least be a means 
through which the special advocate could request further government records and a positive 
obligation on the Crown enforceable by the Tribunal or court. "Relevance" could be determined by 
the Tribunal or court, applying a standard which reflects the potential interests at stake and the Bill's 
policy of expeditious determination of proceedings.201 
(c) Independence 
It is also unclear whether the "designated agency" will be a new agency established for this 
purpose or added to an existing agency, raising potential issues as to the independence of the special 
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advocate function. It is essential that affected persons see the special advocate to be acting on their 
behalf, and not as an extension of the state. 
In the United Kingdom the administrative and physical proximity of SASO to the government 
has raised concerns among civil society groups, affected persons and their counsel about its 
independence.202  
The risk of affiliation is increased by the Bill's requirement that the chief executive of the 
Department administering the Act pay the costs of the special advocate.203 The designated agency 
itself should pay the special advocates, to ensure there is no actual or apparent conflict of interest on 
behalf of the Department. As noted by the Inspector-General, funding special advocates is "an 
expensive part of the process".204 It is important that the level of funding is high enough to ensure 
that competent, experienced counsel are recruited and retained as special advocates. The proposed 
extension of the use of classified information is certain to result in an increase in the function's use 
in the future. 
(d) Alternatives 
The above limitations on the special advocate function are problematic because the Bill does not 
provide for protection against prejudicial disclosure by measures less than non-disclosure and the 
use of special advocates. 
As discussed, the Bill significantly extends the definition and range of use of classified 
information, such that the potential seriousness of any risk of prejudice from disclosure of that 
information varies significantly. However, despite this substantial variation, all classified 
information is treated the same; it cannot be disclosed to an affected person.  
There is a compelling argument that the Tribunal or court should be able to balance the public 
interest in disclosure against the public interest in non-disclosure, such as was carried out by the 
English High Court in R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State.205 
Where the public interest in disclosure is greater, the Tribunal or court could be empowered to 
authorise forms and conditions of disclosure that reflect this balancing. For example, where 
disclosure of information poses a reputational risk, in camera proceedings attended by an affected 
person, accompanied by a non-disclosure undertaking and/or a publication ban, may be more 
appropriate than non-disclosure and the exclusion of the affected person.206  
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On the other hand, in circumstances where genuine national security or public safety interests 
are at stake, including where security intelligence operations could be jeopardised, the Tribunal or 
court would be open to decide that the special advocate function was the only form of disclosure 
available. The balancing exercise, however, would ensure that there is a solid evidential basis for 
those security or safety concerns. 
This balance would increase fairness to the affected person by ensuring that non-disclosure is 
necessary and justified in all the circumstances, while still achieving Parliament's objective of 
enabling the deportation of potentially dangerous or undesirable individuals, without jeopardising 
intelligence sources or methods. 
3 Overall proportionality 
The final question is whether the harm to affected persons is proportionate to the social 
advantage from non-disclosure; "the more severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the more 
important the objective must be."207 
This issue underlies many of the points already made; non-disclosure and the special advocate 
function, as currently proposed, constitutes a substantial derogation from the right to be heard, with 
potentially very serious consequences for an affected person. At the same time, national security and 
public safety are perhaps the most fundamental concerns of any government, and fall into an area in 
which the courts are more hesitant to interfere. Tipping J in Hansen explains:208  
There is a spectrum which extends from matters which involve major political, social or economic 
decisions at one end to matters which have a substantial legal content at the other. The closer to the legal 
end of the spectrum, the greater the intensity of the Court's review is likely to be. The reality is, 
however, that a particular matter may partake of a number of different elements involving different 
aspects of this spectrum.  
The last statement is especially pertinent, as while national security is very much at the political 
end of the spectrum, an area in which the court is well qualified to make its own judgment is the 
requirements of a fair hearing.  
Had the non-disclosure of classified information been limited to security intelligence 
information that was genuinely sensitive due to the nature and sources of that information, the 
argument for institutional deference would be more persuasive. 
However, as previously discussed, the use of classified information under the Bill goes much 
further, encompassing information from 14 different government agencies, and able to be classified 
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simply on the basis that it, might, disclose operational methods and relates to allegations of minor 
criminal offending or activities that could potentially embarrass the New Zealand government. 
While these concerns are not necessarily trivial, they do not justify the automatic non-disclosure 
of information to an affected person facing deportation, with its potentially serious consequences. 
The introduction of special advocates cannot be used to justify a reduction in the procedural 
protection that an affected person would otherwise be entitled to.  
Therefore without the ability of the Tribunal or courts to ensure that non-disclosure is necessary, 
the author concludes that the non-disclosure of classified information under the Bill, with the use of 
special advocates, is not a justifiable limitation on the right to be heard.  
V CONCLUSION 
A special advocate in the United Kingdom described their role:209 
I see it as mitigating the unfairness which is inherent in a system where the appellant, one party to the 
proceedings, does not know all the material that they are supposed to be meeting or answering. … The 
system of Special Advocates can never overcome that irreducible element of unfairness but, having 
accepted that, I think that the functions that we try to perform can at least mitigate it and is better than 
not having a system where there is a partisan representative. 
The special advocate function established by the Bill retains this intrinsic problem.  Nonetheless, 
the author has suggested a number of improvements with which the function could at least be a 
justifiable breach of the Bill of Rights Act. 
First, not all the interests protected by non-disclosure under the Bill warrant this response in 
light of the interests at stake for an affected person. The Tribunal or court should have the ability, in 
proceedings before it, to balance public interest in disclosure against the public interest in non-
disclosure. Where the public interest in disclosure is greater, the Tribunal or court should be 
empowered to authorise forms and conditions of disclosure that reflect this balancing.  
Second, where non-disclosure is necessary, the special advocate must be given sufficient ability 
to present the affected person's case. This requires full disclosure by the Minister of all relevant 
classified information, enforceable by the Tribunal or court. The proposed communication regime 
should also be reconsidered and the special advocate must be guaranteed necessary support and 
funding, whilst maintaining sufficient independence from the state. 
As a general conclusion the author again emphasises that special advocates can only serve to 
mitigate the disadvantage to which the affected person would otherwise be subject. For this reason 
we should be very wary of "function creep". True procedural fairness hinges on a person's right to 
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know the case and to meet it, a right that the proposed special advocate system cannot supplant or 
satisfy.  
 
